About the Perestroika Deception
In 1984, former KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn published a remarkable book, New Lies for Old, alleging that in the near future the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, working in collaboration with sister parties worldwide, would feign its own demise for three main purposes: 1) deceiving Western governments as to communism’s long-range goal of overthrowing the “bourgeois” states, 2) attracting Western capital to revitalize the Soviet Union’s ailing command economy, and 3) removing any justification for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization anti-Soviet military posture. Five years later, the ruling communist party in Poland invited “non”-communists into the government and, in 1990, the ruling communist party in East Germany “capitulated” by uniting with West Germany. The demise of the Soviet Bloc had supposedly begun.
His predictions vindicated, in March 1989, Golitsyn submitted a memorandum to the US Central Intelligence Agency, further outlining the Soviet deception strategy in concert with the leaders of Red China. This and other memos were published in his second book, The Perestroika Deception (1995, 1998). An excerpt, with links to supporting documentation, follows:
PREDICTIONS ON THE EXECUTION OF THE STRATEGY’S FINAL PHASE
Expanded Role of the Communist Party
During “perestroika,” the political role of the Communist Party in communist countries will increase, not decrease. The Party will continue to exercise overall supervision and control over the mixed economy through Party members among the managers and technocrats. The Party, operating “underground” and “working by other means,” will provide political guidance to the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies and other “reformed” and successor parliaments and to the new “political parties” and “grassroots democratic associations” through Party cells and individual Party members in the leaderships of these organizations. Guidance to Party members will be given through confidential briefings. Freed from day-to-day supervision over the economy, the Party will devote itself to guiding and implementing “perestroika” in the USSR and Eastern Europe and to implementing the strategy in the West. The Soviet Party apparatus will become a true general staff of world revolution to be carried out through the strategy of “perestroika.”
Stronger, Maturer Ideology
Despite the apparent renunciation of ideological orthodoxy, Communist ideology will grow stronger and more mature. As “perestroika” proceeds, ideology in the Communist countries will be reasserted. Each success for “perestroika” will reinforce the belief of Party members and young Communists in the correctness of their ideology and their cause. Communists will continue to analyze international relations and the situation in the capitalist countries in terms of class analysis. Their “humanism” will continue to see love and hate in class terms. Capitalists, home-grown and foreign, will be hated, never loved; and they will invariably be deceived and take for a ride.
The Party will continue with ideological education and training to prevent contamination by foreign ideologies. Attempts to reform and replace capitalism in the West will be accelerated, not through ideological propaganda, but through the strategy of “perestroika,” leading to “convergence.”
An Improved, Reorganized KGB
One can expect that the KGB will be converted into a new organization with a Western-style name. The reorganization will be presented as a reduction of the role of the service in Soviet society. But, because the KGB’s crucial role in promoting “perestroika” internally and abroad, the reorganization should not be seen as a downgrading. Just as Dzerzhinskiy’s hated Cheka was converted into the more powerful GPU, so will the successor organization to the KGB be more powerful than its predecessor.
The new service will work with kid gloves and more sophisticated methods. Internally, its resources will be devoted to the creation of controlled political plurality (“democratism”). It will create a pseudo-social democratic party and Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Muslim national parties: it will even set up Stalinist and anti-Semitic groups, to give a convincing impression of plurality. Naturally, the service will be behind these groups and parties—controlling and managing them in the interests of the strategy and its objectives. The service will use its intelligence and security assets, particularly its agents of influence in the newly created national fronts, political groups and parties, to carry out the strategy of “restructuring” attitudes and polices in the West.
The New Model Soviet Regime
The Soviets will proceed with “perestroika” on the following lines:
1) A mixed socialist-market economy comparable to the Swedish economy will be established with one crucial difference. Soviet “capitalists” will in fact be secret Party members and Party political tools. Their influence will be used in the interests of the strategy abroad. This is what Soviet maturity means.
2) The Party will create controlled plurality a semblance of social democracy in the USSR. It will not be difficult to do. Even the Stalinist regime in Poland had nominally “non-Communist” “independent” parties. In fact, they were puppet parties.
3) As a mature body, the Soviet parliament will play an active role in the execution of the strategy abroad.
4) The new parliament will be closer to the Swedish model—again, with one difference. It will use its contacts with Western colleagues to influence them towards cooperation and “restructuring” in the West.
5) The Soviet Empire will not crumble as a result of nationalist unrest. The Party will create a stronger federation which will be in full control of foreign policy, defence and security but which will provide autonomy to the national Republics to run their own local affairs.
6) As the Party proceeds with successful “perestroika” in the USSR, both Russians and non-Russians will be increasingly inclined to accept it and take part in the process. In the final analysis, their attitude will depend on Western support for Soviet “perestroika” and the improvement in their way of life.
7) Successful Soviet “perestroika” will result in a Soviet regime of pseudo-social democracy with a human face.
8 ) At this juncture, the Party and the successor to the KGB will do their utmost to exploit the image of their new model, their prestige and the contacts and influence of the new parliament, the national fronts, the political groups and parties and the Soviet capitalists, to carry out the intended strategy of “restructuring” in the West.
“Restructuring” in Eastern Europe and China
A consistent effort will be made to expand and deepen “restructuring” in Eastern Europe and China. The new models will be like Soviet “perestroika” in essence but will reflect the specific national and historical features of each country.
For instance, in Poland the model will include Communist power-sharing with Solidarity and the Catholic hierarchy. In Czechoslovakia, the model will include the experience of 1968; in Hungary the rehabilitation of the revolt of 1956; in East Germany, the desire for reunion with West Germany; and in China, it will reflect the Asian character of socialism, the desire for reunion with Taiwan and the present close relations with the United States. Polish and East German “restructuring” should be particularly closely watched because of their relevance to the “restructuring” of Western Europe.
“Restructuring” in Western Europe
“Perestroika” in the USSR and Eastern Europe will be accompanied by a determined Soviet political and diplomatic offensive to introduce “restructuring” in Western Europe. Gorbachev and East European leaders will try to develop the present détente into close economic, military, political, cultural and scientific cooperation to create “one Europe” without NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A particular effort will be made to develop close relations and cooperation with East European social democrats and the Labour Party in Britain—exploiting the new Soviet pseudo-social democratic, mixed economy image. Attracted by this image and convinced of its authenticity, the social democrats may well respond to this courting.
East Germany will play a crucial role in the “restructuring” of Western Europe and of West Germany in particular. The appointment of Valentin Falin, a leading Soviet expert on Germany, as head of the Central Committee’s Department of International Relations, indicates that the Soviets are preparing and counting on an East Germany initiative. Such an initiative will probably be supported by a Polish demarche such as revival of Rapacki plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. This time, one can expect the Soviets to remove the Berlin Wall. There is no doubt that their strategists realize that they will be unable to proceed with the strategy of “restructuring” in Europe without removal of the Berlin Wall—just as they were unable to proceed without a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Through removal of the Berlin Wall, the Soviets may be able to strike a new, Rapallo-style deal with the West Germans, particularly with a Social Democratic government, entailing their departure from NATO and acceptance of neutrality.
Given that Soviet “perestroika” incorporates by design many Euro-Communist positions (criticism of Soviet repressive practices, condemnation of the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, broadening Soviet democracy), Euro-Communist parties will join and support the movement for “restructuring” in Europe which will give them new opportunities for revitalizing themselves. They will attempt to establish unity of action with social democrats to bring about “restructuring” in their own countries. Dubcek’s re-emergence from obscurity and his recent visit to Italy at the invitation of the Italian Communist Party supports the notion that the Euro-Communists will seek to exploit Soviet and East European “perestroika” to regain political influence in their own countries. Support for Soviet and East European “perestroika” by the Italian and French governments renders the socialist parties of these countries vulnerable to approaches from the Communists.
“Restructuring” in the Third World
An active Soviet and East European offensive to carry out “restructuring” in the Third World can be expected. The present Soviet readiness to contemplate and even encourage the settlement of armed conflicts by their proxies does not mean the abandonment of their objective of Communist penetration of the region concerned. It represents no more than change of tactics. The strategy of “restructuring” broadens Soviet opportunities for gaining influence through the achievement of political solutions. The reformed regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will engage with the West European social democratic parties and the Socialist International in introducing and carrying out “restructuring” in the Third World and particularly in Latin America. Exploiting the debt problem and the example of Soviet “perestroika,” they will seek unity of action with labour, religious, student, human rights and ecological movements. The impact of Soviet “perestroika” on these countries may be expected to grow. The Mexican press is already drawing parallels between Soviet “perestroika” and political change in Mexico described as “Salinastroika.” The former Mexican communist leader made the same comparison. Fuentes, the left-wing Mexican novelist, wrote recently that Salinas must become a Mexican Gorbachev if he wishes to change the state of affairs in Mexico. Another example is the recent offer of the Salvadorean guerrilla leaders to disarm themselves if the Salvadorean army is restructured.
These examples indicate the beginning of a trend towards “restructuring” in Latin America. The trend will accelerate if the United States begins to help it without taking into account the Soviet strategic design that lies behind it.
Given the fragility of democracy, the desperate economic situation and the debt problem, particularly in Latin America, one can expect an active, joint operation by the Soviets, the East Europeans and European social democrats (with their money) to bring to power Allende- or Sandinista-type regimes and “restructuring” in these countries along the lines of the new, reformed Soviet model.
“Restructuring” American Military-Political Alliances
The Soviets will exploit the image of the reformed and peaceful Soviet systems to shatter the Western consensus about the Soviet threat and the need for political and military alliances. In Europe, the Soviets will probably attempt to create a serious rift in NATO or break it up altogether by removing the Berlin Wall and reaching a Rapallo-style deal with West Germany involving West Germany withdrawing from NATO and following Austria into neutrality. In Asia, the Soviets may attempt to break up the US-Japan security pact by returning the Kurile Islands to Japan and offering Japan economic concessions to promote the development of Siberia.
As the Soviets carry out “restructuring” in the Third World, they will use their influence to reduce the American presence in the region.
“Restructuring” in the United States
The Soviets will do their utmost to persuade the new Administration (of US President George H. W. Bush) to follow Reagan’s policy of embracing “perestroika” and rapprochement with the Soviet Union. They will intensify the efforts of Gorbachev and Sakharov to engage the American elite in cooperation over the environment, space, disarmament and the joint “solution” of social, political, economic, environmental, military and international problems.
Visits by Soviet scientists, politicians, intellectuals and cultural delegations will be stepped up in order to put across to the Americans the ideas of “restructuring” and convergence. Likewise, more American scientists, intellectuals, opinion-formers, politicians and religious groups will be invited to the USSR where they will be subjected to persuasion on the advantages of “restructuring” and convergence.
Soviet agents of influence in the United States will redouble their attempts to act as catalysts in promoting “restructuring” and convergence. They will initiate public debates on security aimed at shattering the American consensus on the Soviet threat and destabilizing and “restructuring” the US military-industrial complex. KGB agents among Soviet “dissidents” and cultural defectors will travel back and forth between the United States and the USSR acting as bridge-builders in cultural and political convergence. The whole political potential of the KGB-controlled political parties and so-called “grassroots organizations” will be used to establish links with their genuine counterparts in the United States and influence them toward “restructuring.”
During their visits to the United States they will try to impress the Americans with the growing similarity of their system to the American system and to convince them of the soundness of convergence as a means of avoiding nuclear war.
As “restructuring” proceeds in Eastern Europe, the East Europeans will join the Soviet offensive to gain a foothold in the United States to secure their share of political influence over the American ethnic minorities.
(Anatoliy Golitsyn, The Perestroika Deception: The World’s Slide Towards the Second October Revolution: Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency, London: Edward Harle, 1995, 1998; pages 27-32)
CHINA: A STRATEGIC ENEMY OF THE UNITED STATES
Communist China is not a strategic partner but a concealed strategic enemy of the United States. China will join in the Soviet offensive to bring about ‘restructuring’ in the United States and worldwide.
Through penetration, Chinese Communist intelligence destroyed the ClA’s sources in China during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s and prevented the Agency developing reliable sources on the strategic intentions of the Chinese leaders. The National Security Agency cannot help because information on secret Sino-Soviet strategic coordination is not carried on accessible communications channels.
This situation leaves American policymakers poorly informed on the subject. American policymakers from the time of Nixon and Kissinger to the present day have become known for their excessive reliance on the verbal assurances of Mao, Chou En-Lai and Deng. Reliance on their word is no substitute for good intelligence.
Because of this intelligence gap, America’s policymakers have not distinguished between China’s tactics and her strategy. This failure is not new: it was evident as early as the Second World War when the Americans failed to realise that the Chinese Communists’ cooperation with the Nationalists against the Japanese was a tactic adopted in order to achieve their strategic objective – their victory over the Nationalists. Some of the statements of the Chinese leaders to their own followers are unflattering about American policymakers and are, in fact, disturbing. In the late 1960s, Mao advised the Party not to take the Americans seriously in a strategic, but only in a tactical sense. Deng’s well known statement about a cat catching a mouse, made when China was introducing capitalism and receiving American technology, can be interpreted as meaning that the Chinese Communist leader is the cat that caught the American mouse.
Because of their confusion, American policymakers believe that Communist China is an important strategic partner and a strategic rival and enemy of the Soviet Union. In this they are wrong. China is a tactical, not a strategic partner of the United States and a tactical, but not a strategic “enemy” of the Soviet Union.
The grounds for this conclusion are to be found by analysing the long-range Communist strategy which illuminates the strategic role of China.
Communist China was one of the principal architects of the Communists’ long-range strategy. The Sino-Soviet ‘split’ was a common strategic disinformation operation to secure the successful preparation of their common strategy of ‘restructuring’. The Soviet and Chinese leaders have continued their secret strategic coordination through a division of labour.
Gorbachev’s ‘perestroika’ and Deng’s ‘Four Modernisations’ (a Chinese euphemism for ‘restructuring’, or ‘perestroika’) are two similar elements in the final phase of the common strategy.
In the light of the new method of analysis, the purpose of Shevardnadze’s hastily arranged trip to China on the eve of President Bush’s visit was to give advice to Deng on his talks with the American President. Gorbachev and Deng will use their meeting to discuss coordination and new initiatives to be taken during the final phase of the strategy The new analysis sees the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as a tactical move en route to the principal strategic objective – ‘restructuring’ e.g., engaging the United States in support of ‘perestroika’.
China’s close relations with the United States and even Chinese helpfulness to the United States over the Pakistan-Afghanistan situation are tactics intended to secure China’s primary strategic objective of becoming a modem superpower with the help of American technology.
According to this analysis, the Chinese leaders are using their own Party apparatus and security services to try to repeat Soviet successes in creating controlling political opposition and introducing its members to the United States in order to shape American policy in the interests of a common Communist strategy.
In fact the Chinese have been so impressed by Sakharov’s success in gaining influence in the United States that they are developing their own Sakharovs – agents of influence among leading Chinese ‘dissident’ scientists. Thus it can be predicted that the Chinese will establish their own foothold of influence in the United States and will eventually join the Soviet offensive to procure American ‘restructuring’.
For China is destined to become a primary Soviet partner in the future World Government towards which Moscow and Peking are jointly proceeding.
(Golitsyn, The Perestroika Deception, pages 35-36)